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ESSAYS
TWOMBLY AND IQBAL RECONSIDERED
Brian T. Fitzpatrick*
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most controversial decisions thus far from the
United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts may
have been in the usually mundane area of civil procedure.' In a pair
of decisions two years apart, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal,3 the Court made a jarring shift in its jurisprudence on what
plaintiffs need to plead in their complaints in order to keep their suits
from being dismissed at the very outset of litigation. These decisions
have been described as "the most significant. . . in a decade for day-to-
day litigation in the federal courts ... ."4 Indeed, the decisions are on
@ 2012 Brian T. Fitzpatrick. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. J.D., 2000,
Harvard Law School. I am grateful for helpful comments on a previous draft from
John McGinnis, Richard Nagareda, and the participants in the Center for Business
Law & Regulation Colloquium at Case Western Reserve University Law School. I am
also grateful to Allison Davis, Alex Dickerson, Drew Dorner, and Sybil Dunlop for
helpful research assistance.
1 See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival I
(Fla. Int'l Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-17, 2011), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1914743 ("[W]e see a [Roberts] Court
... engaged in an unexpected area-civil procedure . . .
2 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
4 Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 21, 2009, at A1O (quoting Thomas C. Goldstein).
1621
HeinOnline  -- 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1621 2011-2012
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
pace to become the most cited Supreme Court cases of all time.5 And
the scholarly criticism of the two cases has been withering.6
In particular, commentators believe the decisions will spark a
revolution in federal court litigation, and they have criticized the deci-
sions as gifts to the business community that were delivered by judicial
fiat. According to commentators, the Court ignored, distinguished,
or disavowed long-standing precedents in order to find new meaning
in the text of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure-Rule 8(a)-that
reads today as it has since 1938. As far as these commentators are
concerned, these decisions are nothing short of "conservative judicial
activism."7
Although I agree with some of this criticism, I think some of it is
overstated. First, Twombly and Iqbal may not be nearly as revolutionary
as first meets the eye; as a practical matter, lower federal courts long
ago elevated pleading standards in the face of the exponential
increases in discovery costs faced by corporate defendants. Second,
charges of 'judicial activism" in this context have a bit less salience
than they do in the more typical contexts in which they are made-
contexts in which the Court has usurped the authority of another
branch of government-because the text the Court reinterpreted in
these decisions was a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, something that
the Court itself promulgated and can change at any time. Finally, I
think the Court's motives in Twombly and Iqbal-to recalibrate plain-
tiffs' discovery rights in light of the exponential increases in discovery
costs that have developed in the years since the Federal Rules were
first promulgated in 1938-were pure, even if its methods were not.
5 See Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1337, 1337 n.4 (2010) (" Twombly has managed to induce an absolutely extraordi-
nary 29,704 cases to cite it in its first thirty-seven months as law, as measured by a
Westlaw KeyCite on July 2, 2010. It is on track to become the most-cited Supreme
Court case of all time, unless it is surpassed by Iqbal itself, which has received 10,263
judicial citations in thirteen months.").
6 See Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REv. 951, 959 (2010) ("Academic criticism of the Twombly
decision was speedy and abundant.").
7 Wayne Parsons, The Conservative judicial Activism Chronicles: Notice Pleading is No
Longer the Law in Federal Court, INJURYBOARD HONOLULU (July 28, 2009, 2:26 PM),
http://honolulu.injuryboard.com/defective-and-dangerous-products/news-alert-for-
trial-attorneys-notice-pleading-is-no-longer-the-law-in-federal-court.aspx; see also Patri-
cia W. Hatamyar, The Tao ofPleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal MatterEmpirically ? 59 AM.
U. L. REv. 553, 555 (2010) (noting that many have criticized Iqbal as "judicial activ-
ism"); Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and Procedural judicial Activism, 37 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 901, 905 (2010); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 10-12.
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In Part I of this Essay, I describe the Court's decisions in Twombly
and Iqbal and how they represent a break in the Court's pleading juris-
prudence. In Part II, I respond to the criticism of Twombly and Iqbal
as revolutionary, conservative judicial activism. In Part III, I argue
that, although the Court's motives in Twombly and Iqbal were pure,
there may be better responses than elevated pleading standards to the
challenges of discovery that only Congress can impose, such as fee-
shifting rules.
I. FROM "MERE NOTICE" TO "NOTICE PLUS PLAUSIBILITY" PLEADING
In order to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a), a plaintiffs complaint must set forth "a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ."8
If the plaintiffs complaint does not meet this standard, then the court
can dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on a motion by the defendant
before the case proceeds any further.9 If the plaintiffs complaint
does meet the requirements of Rule 8(a), then the case can go for-
ward, the plaintiff can take discovery of the defendant,'0 and the
defendant usually cannot stop the case again until discovery is com-
pleted and a motion for summary judgment is filed."
Until 2007, the Supreme Court had been consistent-and usually
unanimous-in admonishing lower courts that Rule 8 did not require
very much of plaintiffs. Indeed, the Federal Rules were designed to go
easy on plaintiffs: one of the motivations behind their adoption in
1938 was to eradicate the treacherous technicalities of common law
pleading and replace them with a "liberal" regime called "notice
pleading."12 Under this notice-pleading regime, plaintiffs were
required only to plead enough to put the defendant on fair notice of
what the plaintiffs claim was about' 3-i.e., just as many factual allega-
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
9 See FED. R. Cv. P. 12(b) (6).
10 See FED. R. Cv. P. 26-37.
11 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
12 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 648; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
573-74 (discussing the intent of the drafters of the Rules to depart from English com-
mon law pleading tradition); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests,
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IowA L. REv. 821, 824-25 (2010) (discussing how the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 liberalized pleading requirements).
13 See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2010) ("Thus, pleadings under the rules simply may be a gen-
eral summary of the party's position that is sufficient to advise the other party of the
event being sued upon . . . .").
20121 1623
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tions as necessary to enable the defendant to file an answer to the
complaint and prepare for discovery. 14
The example complaints-known as the "forms"-that are
appended to the Federal Rules demonstrate what the Rules them-
selves call the "brevity" of what they require.1 5 Form 11, for example,
a complaint for negligence, says little more than the defendant's car
hit the plaintiff in a particular location on a particular date. 16 Indeed,
the entire nonjurisdictional content of the complaint could easily be
reproduced in the previous footnote.
The Supreme Court followed the plaintiff-friendly design of Rule
8 for some seventy years after its adoption.1 7 Indeed, under the
Court's precedents, plaintiffs usually had more to fear from pleading
too much than from pleading too little. So long as the factual allega-
tions in the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendant enough informa-
tion to file an answer and a court could imagine some set of facts both
consistent with the complaint as well as the legal elements of the plaintiffs
claims, then the plaintiffs case could move forward.' 8 As the Court
put it on one occasion, "[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is
clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could
be proved consistent with the allegations." 9 Plaintiffs who pled more
than necessary risked saying something that would render the com-
plaint inconsistent with the legal elements of the claims. The best
policy, then, was often to say as little as possible.20
The Court made it very clear over the years that the plaintiffs
complaint need not contain many factual allegations because the
14 See id. § 1203 (noting that a complaint is sufficient if it "enable[s] the defen-
dant to frame his answer").
15 See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 84 ("The forms in the Appendix suffice under these
rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.").
16 See FED. R. Civ. P. App. 11 ("On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove
a motor vehicle against the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured,
lost wages or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical
expenses of $ _ .").
17 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (unanimous);
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163 (1993) (unanimous); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (unanimous).
18 See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46 ("[W]e follow, of course, the accepted rule that a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.").
19 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
20 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1665, 1685 (1998) (noting that the standards were so lax a plaintiff affirmatively had
to plead "himself out of court" (quoting Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75,
79 (7th Cir. 1992))).
1624 [VOL. 87.4
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pleading stage was not the time to develop the facts; the proper time
for that, the Court said, was during discovery. 21 Moreover, the only
purpose of the complaint, the Court said, was to put the defendant on
notice. 22 If any moTe confirmation was needed of that, the Court
added, just look at the brevity of the forms that append the Rules.23
Indeed, the Court made it clear that the pleading stage was not the
time to dismiss unmeritorious suits; the place for that, the Court said,
was summary judgment. 24 As the Court put it unanimously only nine
years ago, "Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to
whether a claim will succeed on the merits. 'Indeed it may appear on
the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely
but that is not the test.'" 25
In recent decades, lower federal courts have had trouble with the
laxity of the Court's Rule 8 jurisprudence. I will have more to say
about this below, but, for now, suffice it to say that, from time to time,
lower federal courts tried to elevate the pleading requirements for
what they thought were very sound policy reasons. Each time they did
so, however, the Supreme Court reversed. Thus, in Leatherman v. Tar-
rant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,26 the Supreme
Court unanimously turned back an effort by lower courts to heighten
pleading standards in cases against government officials because of
21 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 ("This simplified notice pleading standard
relies on liberal discovery rules . . . to define disputed facts and issues .... ); Conley,
355 U.S. at 47-48 ("[T] he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant
to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the
Rules require is . . . [to] give the defendant fair notice . . . . Such simplified 'notice
pleading' is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pre-
trial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both
claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues." (foot-
notes omitted)).
22 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (declaring that all plaintiffs must do is "'give
the defendant fair notice . . . .'" (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)); Conley, 355 U.S. at
47 ("[A]ll the Rules require is ... [to] give the defendant fair notice . . . .").
23 See Swierhiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 n.4 ("These requirements are exemplified by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms . . . ."); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 ("The illus-
trative forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this.").
24 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 ("[C]laims lacking merit may be dealt with
through summary judgment under Rule 56."); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) ("In the absence of
... an amendment [to Rule 8], federal courts and litigants must rely on summary
judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather
than later.").
25 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974)).
26 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
20121 1625
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the burdens these suits imposed on state and local governments. 27
Similarly, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 28 the Court unanimously
turned back an effort by lower courts, for similar reasons, to heighten
pleading standards in cases alleging employment discrimination. 29
Both times, the Court said, although there may be sound reasons to
elevate pleading standards, the proper way to go about doing it is to
revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.30
It therefore came as something of a surprise when, in 2007,
Twombly came down the way it did. In Twombly, the Court dismissed a
nationwide class action complaint alleging that several telecommuni-
cations providers conspired both to protect themselves from each
other and to exclude other competitors from their networks.31 The
antitrust laws required the plaintiffs to prove the providers had come
to an agreement amongst themselves to do these things, and the
plaintiffs dutifully alleged in the complaint that the providers had
entered into such "agreements."32 The Court, however, said that alle-
gation was not enough. The Court said that the plaintiffs needed
either to allege which of the providers and their employees entered
into the agreements, and when and where they did so, 33 or to allege
some story that, "in light of common economic experience," made the
actions of the providers irrational in the absence of an agreement.34
27 See id. at 168 ("We think that it is impossible to square the 'heightened plead-
ing standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of 'notice
pleading' set up by the Federal Rules.").
28 534 U.S 506 (2002).
29 See id. at 515 (" [T]he Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading
standard for employment discrimination suits.").
30 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 ("Respondent argues that allowing lawsuits
based on conclusory allegations of discrimination to go forward will burden the
courts and encourage disgruntled employees to bring unsubstantiated suits.
Whatever the practical merits of this argument,... [a] requirement for greater speci-
ficity for particular claims is a result that 'must be obtained by the process of amend-
ing the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.'" (quoting Leatherman, 507
U.S. at 168 (internal citation omitted))); Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 ("Perhaps if
Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities . . . might be sub-
jected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which
must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation.").
31 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
32 See id. at 550.
33 See id. at 565 n.10 ("[T)he complaint here furnishes no clue as to which of the
four [providers] (much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when
and where the illicit agreement took place.").
34 Id. at 546.
1626 [VOL. 87:4
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But what of the notion that, so long as there was some set of facts
consistent with the complaint and the legal elements of the cause of
action, the case could go forward? This was what the Court had called
the "accepted rule" in 1957.35 The Court was not shy about the jar-
ring shift it was making: this "accepted rule"-"one of [the Court's]
earliest statements about pleading under the Federal Rules" 36-was,
the Twombly Court said, going into "retirement."3 7
The Court said that it was no longer enough for a complaint to
put the defendant on notice of the claims against it; rather, the allega-
tions in the complaint now have to show that it is "plausible" that the
plaintiffs case will succeed.38 For the complaint before it, the Court
said it was "[a] sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement" and
a "reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
.agreement."39 Gone was "mere notice" pleading; enter "notice plus
plausibility" pleading.
But what of the notions that discovery was the proper place to
learn the facts of the case and that summary judgment after such dis-
covery had closed-not the pleadings before such discovery had even
begun-was the proper place to weed out meritorious claims? The
Court backtracked here, too. Summaryjudgment was too late to weed
out meritorious claims, the Court said, because discovery had become
far too costly and burdensome to force defendants to endure it with-
out at least some assurance that the endeavor had some merit to it.40
The Court noted that discovery is "expensive"-indeed, that is a
"potentially enormous expense"-and that it "take [s] up the time of a
number of other people."41 The Court argued that this "threat of dis-
covery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even ane-
mic cases," and, as such, discovery "represent[s] an in terrorem
increment of the settlement value" of a case. 42 In other words,
although it may very well be true that discovery and not the pleadings
is the place to learn the facts of case, the Court seemed to say that, in
light of the burdens discovery imposes on defendants, plaintiffs are
just plain out of luck if they do not know enough of the facts at the
35 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
36 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8.
37 Id. at 563 ("[T]his famous observation has earned its retirement.").
38 Id. at 556.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 557-59.
41 Id. at 558-59 (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)).
42 Id.
162720121
HeinOnline  -- 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1627 2011-2012
1628 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:4
outset of their cases to justify opening the defendant's files to learn
more.
In these passages, the Court revealed that it was fundamentally
transforming its understanding of the purpose of the pleadings in fed-
eral litigation. For seventy years, the purpose of the complaint had
been merely to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiffs claims so
the defendant could craft a responsive pleading and prepare for dis-
covery.43 In Twombly, the Court added a new purpose: to decide
which cases are worthy of burdening defendants with discovery.44
That is, Twombly transformed the pleadings stage of litigation into a
place where judges are asked to regulate access to discovery.
It is an understatement to say that the Twombly decision has been
very unpopular with scholars.45 Some commentators had hoped that
the Court's decision would be confined to the circumstances that led
to its birth: antitrust cases, complex class actions, or cases with espe-
cially forbidding discovery burdens.46 But, two years later, the Court
made it clear in Ashcroft v. Iqbal47 that this was not to be the case. The
Court in Iqbal dismissed a civil rights claim alleging racial and relig-
ious discrimination against high-level government officials responsible
for implementing the country's anti-terrorism policies.48 The Court
noted, as it had when it had turned back efforts by lower courts to
elevate pleading standards in one or another type of case (e.g.,
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz), that the Federal Rules were supposed to
be trans-substantive and apply to complex antitrust claims and less
complex civil rights claims alike.49 Thus, Twombly's plausibility stan-
dard was to apply across the board.
In some ways, the Court's decision in Iqbal was even more difficult
to square with its precedents than Twombly: the inadequate allegation
that Iqbal had been targeted "on account" of his race and religion50
was just like the adequate allegation that Swierkiewicz had lost his job
"on account" of his age and national origin.51 In any event, it is now
43 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 490 (2008).
44 See id. at 452, 490-93.
45 See Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 959.
46 See, e.g., id.; Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA.
L. REv. 473 (2010); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293,
1305 (2010).
47 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
48 See id. at 1943-44.
49 See id. at 1953 ("Our decision in Twombly... applies to antitrust and discrimi-
nation suits alike.").
50 Id. at 1951.
51 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S 506, 509, 514 (2002). The one difference
might be that Swierkiewicz also alleged that he was replaced by someone of a different
HeinOnline  -- 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1628 2011-2012
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clear that the Court meant what it said in Twombly: no civil litigant in
federal court can gain access to discovery without convincing a federal
judge that it is plausible his or her claim will eventually succeed. That
is, federal judges are now supposed to act as gatekeepers to discovery,
and the plausible pleading standard is supposed to be their tool to do
so.
II. THE CRITICISM OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
Twombly and Iqbal are on pace to become the most cited Supreme
Court cases of all time.52 Many commentators believe that the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions are revolutionary, and the scholarly assess-
ment of the revolution has been harsh.53 Although several aspects of
the decisions have been attacked, I wish to focus here on two strands
of criticism in particular. First, critics have attacked the decisions for
bringing about their revolutionary change through judicial fiat rather
than through amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Second, critics have characterized the decisions as a gift to corporate
defendants that will place undue obstacles in the path of plaintiffs
with legitimate claims. In short, commentators have accused the
Court of what some have called "conservative judicial activism."54
As I explain below, although I agree with some of this criticism, I
think some of it is overstated. First, although it is true that the Court's
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal constitute radical changes in the
Court's own pleading jurisprudence, it is far less clear that the deci-
sions will change much of anything about contemporary federal litiga-
tion. As commentators have noted for sometime, as a practical
matter, lower federal courts long ago elevated pleading standards in
the face of the exponential increases in discovery costs faced by corpo-
rate defendants.55 On one view, then, all the Supreme Court did in
Twombly and Iqbal was catch up to what lower courts had been doing
for some time.
age and national origin, see id. at 508, whereas Iqbal did not allege that his mistreat-
ment did not befall persons of a different race and religion. Perhaps a claim for
discrimination moves from the implausible to the plausible when it is alleged that
persons outside the allegedly targeted group were treated differently.
52 See Clermont, supra note 5, at 1337 n.4.
53 See Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 959.
54 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
55 See generally Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiz. L.
REv. 987 (2003) [hereinafter Fairman, Notice Pleading] (arguing that while notice
pleading is supposed to be the law, many courts in fact require fact-based pleading);
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REv. 551 (2002) [hereinafter
Fairman, Heightened Pleading] (same).
20121 1629
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Second, although it might have been more thoughtful and trans-
parent to respond to the changed circumstances of the increased nui-
sance value of discovery by amending rather than reinterpreting Rule
8(a), claims of judicial activism" in this context ring a bit more
hollow than they do in other contexts. Unlike the U.S. Code and the
U.S. Constitution, which are promulgated by the other branches of
government, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated by
the Supreme Court itself. This is not the stuff of the democracy-
threatening judicial activism that so often excites people.
Finally, I am much more sympathetic than most commentators to
the Court's desire to recalibrate plaintiffs' discovery rights in light of
the exponential increases in discovery costs in recent years. The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938, and, needless
to say, things are much different today than they were then.5 6 It is not
surprising that the relative rights of plaintiffs and defendants would
need a readjustment in light of these changes. As I explain, however,
elevated pleading standards may not be the best way to make this
readjustment. As some scholars have begun to contend, fee-shifting
rules may be better tailored to regulating access to discovery.
A. Will Twombly and Iqbal Cause a Revolution?
As I noted above, it is hard to see how the Court's decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal do not constitute jarring breaks with the Court's
own pleading jurisprudence. As a result, many commentators have
declared that the decisions will have "revolutionary" implications for
plaintiffs in federal court, both in how they plead their cases and in
whether their cases will be allowed to go forward to discovery.5 7 Kevin
Clermont and Stephen Yeazell, for example, have said not only that
the decisions are "revolutionary,"5 8 but that they "destabilized the
56 See generally Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Com-
plex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REv. 647 (2011) (arguing that the distortions due to
excesses in process are much different from those corrected in 1938).
57 See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 12; Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher
E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public
Policy Benefits ofTwombly and Iqbal, 33 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1107, 1108 (2010); see
also Richard Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Dis-
guised) Summary judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 77 (2007); Hartnett, supra
note 46; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape ofFederal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv.
517, 527-40 (2010); Spencer, supra note 43; Steinman, supra note 46, at 1293, 1295,
1310; Matthew A. Josephson, Note, Some Things Are Better Left Said: Pleading Practice
After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REv. 867 (2008).
58 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 12, at 839; accord id. at 823, 847.
1630 [VOL. 87:4
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entire system of civil litigation."5 9 They contend the decisions "will
impact the 270,000 civil cases filed annually in the federal courts."60
Likewise, Adam Steinman has said the decisions created a "crisis" that
has the "potential to upend civil litigation as we know it."6 1 As How-
ard Wasserman has noted, "the assumption underlying the flood of
scholarship that followed Iqbal and Twombly was that the cases worked
a major, dramatic change in pleading law."62
I think these sorts of declarations exaggerate the effects the deci-
sions may have in the federal system. Although Twombly and Iqbal
mark a profound shift in the Supreme Court's own understanding of
the pleading rules, the decisions may be less revolutionary to lower
federal courts. Despite the Supreme Court's best efforts prior to
Twombly, these lower federal courts have been using heightened
pleading standards for some time.
The best explication of the dissonance between the Supreme
Court's prior pleading jurisprudence and the practice among lower
federal courts is a pair of articles written almost a decade ago by Chris-
topher Fairman. 63 In these articles, Professor Fairman demonstrated,
in great detail, that "[n]otwithstanding its foundations in the Federal
Rules and repeated Supreme Court imprimatur, notice pleading is a
myth." 64 He found:
To be sure, federal courts recite the mantra of notice pleading with
amazing regularity. However, their rhetoric does not match the
reality of federal pleading practice. Sometimes subtle, other times
overt, federal courts in every circuit impose non-Rule-based height-
ened pleading in direct contravention of notice pleading
doctrine.65
Why did lower courts turn their back on the notice-pleading
regime? First and foremost, Professor Fairman concluded, it was to
protect defendants from "abusive discovery" 66-the exact same reason
why the Supreme Court finally raised pleading standards itself in
Twombly and Iqbal. Professor Fairman's case study of the lower federal
courts has been confirmed by more rigorous empirical studies: even
59 Id. at 823.
60 Id. at 831.
61 Steinman, supra note 46, at 1293, 1295.
62 Wasserman, supra note 1, at 17.
63 See supra note 55.
64 Fairman, Notice Pleading, supra note 55, at 988.
65 Id. (footnote omitted).
66 Id. at 1060.
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before Twombly, federal district courts granted almost half of all
motions to dismiss.67
Thus, on one view, all the Supreme Court did in Twombly and
Iqbal was catch up to what lower courts had been doing for some time.
It is true that the Court's new verbal formulation of "plausibility" is
not identical to the formulations that lower courts had been using.68
Nonetheless, the effect should be the same: to continue to empower
judges to boot cases because they are skeptical of the merits. If this
view is correct, then the decisions may have little practical effect in the
lower courts. Indeed, the earliest empirical studies suggest that this in
fact the case.69
On this point, it should be noted that a very similar phenomenon
was discovered after the Supreme Court's trio of cases in 1986 making
it easier for federal judges to dismiss cases on summary judgment. 70
Commentators then, like now, thought the decisions were revolution-
ary, unwarranted, and a gift to corporate defendants. 7' Although
67 See Hatamyar, supra note 7, at 556 (finding that in the years before Twombly
forty-six percent of motions to dismiss were granted).
68 See Fairman, Notice Pleading, supra note 55, at 998-1010.
69 SeeJOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS To DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER Iqbal, Federal Judicial Center Report to the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules vii (2011) (finding "a general increase from 2006
to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss," but "no increase in the rate of
grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend" or "in the rate at which a grant
of a motion to dismiss terminated the case"); Hatamyar, supra note 7, at 596-600
(finding that there has been no increase in grants of motion to dismiss without leave
to amend since Twombly, but there has been an increase in grants of motion to dismiss
with leave to amend); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly ? A Study
on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1811, 1815 (2008) (finding that "despite sweeping language and the 'retirement'
of fifty-year-old language," Twombly "appears to have had almost no substantive
impact," with the possible exception of civil rights cases).
70 See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (easing the standard
for summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
(same); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(same).
71 See John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett
with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problem Under Rule 56, 6 REV. LITIG. 227, 248
(1987) (arguing that the Celotex trio "teaches at least abstractly that the moving defen-
dant has no initial burden to produce affirmative evidence, [thus] there is ample
room for aggressive application of the decision against plaintiffs"); Marcy J. Levine,
Summary judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme
Court, 37 EMORY L.J. 171, 214-15 (1988) ("[T]he three decisions basically mean that
summary judgment will be easier for defendant/movants to obtain."); D. Michael Ris-
inger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary judgment on the Supreme Court's
New Approach to SummaryJudgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 42 (1988) (arguing that the
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some of these criticisms may have had merit, empirical studies found
that, like here, the 1986 cases had very little effect on lower court deci-
sions. Lower courts had begun more freely dismissing cases on sum-
mary judgment well before the Supreme Court saw the wisdom in
doing so. 72
It is not altogether surprising that lower courts see these sorts of
nuts-and-bolts questions of civil litigation differently than the
Supreme Court. Lower courts face docket pressures that the Supreme
Court does not face,73 and, as such, they have a greater incentive to
dismiss implausible cases than the Supreme Court does. In addition,
lower court judges tend to be closer to the realities of modem legal
practice than Supreme Court Justices.74 Not only are lower court
judges removed from practice by fewer years than Supreme CourtJus-
tices-when ChiefJustice Roberts joined in 2005, he became the only
member of the Court to have practiced civil litigation since the
1970s 75-but federal district court judges deal with the hassles of dis-
Celotex trio "is bound to lead to many summary judgments improvidently granted in
favor of defendants").
72 See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Centuy of Summary judgment Practice in Six Fed-
eral District Courts, 4J. EMPIRCAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 906 (2007) (noting "few changes in
summary judgment activity after the Supreme Court trilogy").
73 In 2010, 282,307 civil cases and 77,287 criminal cases were filed in United
States District Courts. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS tbls. C & D (2010). In 2008, Federal District CourtJudges were
each assigned an average of 394 civil and 105 criminal cases. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl. 4.1 (2010), http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2009/Table4Ol.pdf (civil); id. tbl.
5.1, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2009/
Table50l.pdf (criminal). By contrast, in the October 2009 term, although 8,159 cases
were placed on the Supreme Court's docket, only 76 writs of certiorari were granted.
See October Term 2009, JOURNAL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES I
(2010).
74 See Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate
Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 97, 148-49 (2006) (arguing that Supreme CourtJus-
tices exhibit "heedlessness [to the] consequences of the[ir] doctrines for the real
world of litigation," and that, as a remedy, presidents should "appoint more district
court judges to ... the Supreme Court").
75 According to the Biographies of the Federal Judiciary, Justice Stevens had last
been in private practice in 1970, Justice O'Connor in 1965, justice Scalia in 1967,
Justice Kennedy in 1975, and Justice Souter in 1968. See Biographical Directory ofFederal
judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2012). In addition to their time in private practice, Justice Scalia
was a federal government lawyer until 1977, and Justices O'Connor and Souter were
state government lawyers until 1969 and 1978, respectively. Id. Justices Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer never spent any time in private practice. Justice Thomas served
a few years as a state government lawyer (until 1977) and an in-house counsel (until
163320121
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covery and trial on a daily basis. As such, they understand, at least to
some extent, the burdens it entails on parties. Supreme Court Jus-
tices, by contrast, do not deal with such hassles. Although they might
have remembered such hassles had they been elevated from the ranks
of the district courts, when Justice Sotomayor joined in 2009, she
became the only member of the Court who had served as a trial
judge.76 Thus, it is not surprising that federal litigation reforms are
fashioned in the lower courts and only later ratified by the Supreme
Court. In other words, there is reason to believe that Twombly and
Iqbal may be less revolutionary than first meets the eye."
B. Are Twombly and Iqbal Examples of Conservative judicial Activism?
Commentators have been the most critical of the way in which
the Supreme Court reset pleading standards in Twombly and Iqbal.
According to commentators, the Court ignored, distinguished, or dis-
avowed long-standing precedents, in order to find new meaning in the
text of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that reads today as it has
since 1938.78 These commentators believe that the changes set forth
in Twombly and Iqbal should have come about, if at all, through the
federal rulemaking mechanism rather than by judicial fiat.79
In light of these sentiments, it is not surprising that a number of
commentators have characterized the Court's decisions as "judicial
activism." 0 Moreover, because the decisions are widely understood to
benefit corporate defendants and impair the plaintiffs who sue
1979); Justice Ginsburg spent many years as a public interest lawyer (until 1980); and
Justice Breyer dabbled in federal government legal jobs of an advisory nature in the
1960s and 1970s. Id. None of them had served as a trial judge. Id. Although the
Justices do hire younger lawyers as law clerks, they are usually freshly out of law school
and have never practiced law at all. Id.
76 Id.
77 Even commentators critical of the Court's decisions have begun to concede
this point. See Clermont, supra note 5, at 1365 ("[I]n the years before Twombly-Iqbal
many pleaders were including tremendous detail, and many observers attributed this
practice to the encouragement, if not requirement, of the lower courts. To some
extent, notice pleading was already gone."); Spencer, supra note 43, at 432 ("[T]he
Court's move [in Twombly] is consistent with long-held sentiment among the lower
federal courts.").
78 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading and the Future of
Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1189 (2010); Clermont, supra note 5, at
1337; Epstein, supra note 57, at 77; Hartnett, supra note 46, at 476; Schneider, supra
note 57, at 527-40; Spencer, supra note 43; Josephson, supra note 56, at 869.
79 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
80 Hatamyar, supra note 7, at 555 (noting that many have criticized Iqbal as "judi-
cial activism"); Jois, supra note 7, at 905.
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them,81 many have characterized the decisions as an example of what
has come to be known as "conservative judicial activism."82 As Profes-
sor Steinman has noted, many scholars view the decisions as only the
most recent examples of the "tendency of the federal judiciary (and
the Supreme Court in particular) to favor defendants, especially cor-
porate and business interests, in civil litigation."83 Professors Cler-
mont and Yeazell concur: "[m]any observers . . . see the same old
right/left story: the conservatives seek to protect rich or powerful
defendants . . . ."84 As does Professor Wasserman: "[the] cases have
the potential to be framed . . . in political terms as the Court's con-
servative majority protecting big business, in keeping with their
broader political and ideological preferences." 85
Although this phrase "judicial activism" is thrown around a great
deal, it has no well-accepted definition.86 One meaning of the phrase
that is sometimes invoked-the disregard of precedent 8 7-could fairly
apply to the Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. Nonetheless,
when commentators, public officials, and the media become most
exercised about 'judicial activism," it is not usually because the judi-
cial branch has in some way recast its own understanding of the law,
but, rather because it has usurped the legal authority of another
branch of government-typically a branch more democratically
accountable than the judicial branch.88 Thus, it is when a court
81 See Steinman, supra note 46, at 1351 ("[Alccess to discovery may present a
zero-sum game. Stricter pleading standards help defendants at the expense of plain-
tiffs, and more lenient pleading standards help plaintiffs at the expense of
defendants.").
82 Parsons, supra note 7. As Ernie Young has observed, "[i]t is very much in
vogue these days to accuse the [Supreme] Court of 'conservative judicial activism.'"
Ernest A. Young, judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1139,
1139 (2002).
83 Steinman, supra note 46, at 1325.
84 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 12, at 850.
85 Wasserman, supra note 1, at 10-13 (further noting that, although "the pure
attitudinal model does not work in the main run of procedure cases," it does "reveal
itself in the most fundamental procedure cases," including Iqbal)
86 See Young, supra note 82, at 1145-60 (listing several common usages of the
phrase).
87 See id. at 1149-51.
88 See, e.g., Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Meanings of "Judicial Activism", 92
CAIF. L. REv. 1441, 1464-65 (2004) ("[T]he Court is engaging in judicial activism
when it reaches beyond the clear mandates of the Constitution to restrict the handi-
work of other government branches."); see also Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutional-
ism, It's Judicial Activism, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 296 (1996) ("By judicial
activism I mean, quite simply and specifically, the practice by judges of disallowing
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strikes down a piece of legislation"9 or interprets a democratically-
enacted text (like a statute or a constitutional provision) in light of
what the court itself thinks is "good," 'Just," or "right,"90 that people
tend to get worked up about "judicial activism."
It is hard to make a case that Twombly and Iqbal constitute this
sort of judicial activism. As noted above, the basis of the Court's rul-
ing was Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Although, as I also
noted above, a good case can be made that the Court essentially
rewrote Rule 8 in these decisions, unlike a statute or a constitutional
provision, the Court did not usurp the authority of another branch in
doing so. Unlike statutes and constitutional provisions, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are written by the judicial branch; indeed, they
are promulgated by the Supreme Court itself91 As such, and with one rela-
tively minor caveat,92 it is difficult to make a case that the Court has
usurped the authority of another branch: the law the Court has been
accused of rewriting is a law that the Court itself wrote and that the
Court itself could change at any. time.
policy choices by other government officials or institutions that the Constitution does
not clearly prohibit.").
89 See Viet D. Dinh, Threats to judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J.
929, 939 (2007) ("[Commentators] have dubbed the Rehnquist Court the most
activist in history because of the number of federal statutes it struck down-more
than three dozen federal laws in the past ten years.").
90 Kmiec, supra note 88, at 1473 ("While canons of interpretation have long been
criticized as unhelpful or conclusory, the failure to use the 'tools' of the trade appro-
priately-or not at all-can be labeled 'judicial activism.'"); see also Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain, On judicial Activism, OPEN SPACES Q., Feb. 29, 2004, at 23 ("Judicial activ-
ism means not the mere failure to defer to political branches or to vindicate norms of
predictability and uniformity; it means only the failure to do so in order to advance
another, unofficial objective.").
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to pre-
scribe general rules of practice and procedure . .. in the United States district courts
92 The Rules Enabling Act requires a seven month waiting period after the
Supreme Court promulgates any new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, allowing time
for Congress and the President to enact a law blocking the Rule before it takes effect.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2074. To the extent Twombly and Iqbal rewrote Rule 8(a), Congress
and the President did not enjoy the benefit of this window. Nonetheless, nothing
prevents the political branches from overruling Twombly and Iqbal now; thus, to the
extent Twombly and Iqbal usurped some power of the political branches, it was a rela-
tively minor one: the power to overrule a change before (rather than merely after)
the change takes effect.
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It is true, of course, that, although there is nothing in the U.S.
Code that requires the Supreme Court to do so," the Court typically
rewrites the Federal Rules through the process prescribed by the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, which involves advisory commit-
tees, public comments, and the like.9 4 It is also no doubt true that, as
Professors Clermont and Yeazell have noted, this process adds value
by helping to ensure that any changes take place only after careful
deliberation.9 5 Nonetheless, in light of the judicial nature of the Fed-
eral Rules, the most that I think one can say about Twombly and Iqbal
is that the Court usurped the typical-though, again, not obligatory-
domain of the lower federal court judges who make up the Judicial
Conference. Although this cannot be dismissed blithely, it is not
really the stuff of the democracy-threatening judicial activism that usu-
ally captures our attention. In other words, in Twombly and Iqbal, the
judicial branch did not step on anyone's toes but its own.
C. Was It Time To Do Something About Discovery?
As noted above, almost everyone interprets Twombly and Iqbalas a
boon for corporate defendants and an albatross for the plaintiffs who
sue them. Many of these commentators believe the Court's concerns
over the costs and burdens borne by defendants during discovery are
overblown, or, even if not overblown, nonetheless insufficient reason
to take liberal access to discovery away from plaintiffs.96 As Professor
93 See 28 U.S.C. §2073(e) ("Failure to comply with this section [authorizing the
Judicial Conference to prescribe procedures for considering changes to the Rules]
does not invalidate a rule prescribed under Section 2072 . . . .").
94 See 28 U.S.C. §2073(a)-(d) (requiring the Judicial Conference to create com-
mittees to consider changes to the rules and to prescribe procedures for considering
those changes); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CTS., THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF PRACrICE
AND PROCEDURE (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/Fed-
eralRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx (describing the proce-
dures created by the Judicial Conference); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 13 ("Formally,
the Court is charged by statute with promulgating rules of procedure . ... Practically,
however, the process is controlled by the Standing Committee of the Judicial Confer-
ence and the Civil Rules Advisory Committee . . . .").
95 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 12, at 847 (noting that "this process now guar-
antees that notice, comment, and a good deal of consultation among bench and bar
will precede significant ... procedural change" and thereby it "head[s] off ill-consid-
ered quick fixes").
96 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 78; Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of
Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future ofPrivate Antitrust
Enforcement, 28 REv. LITIG. 1, 17 (2008); Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit
Discovery, 14 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 43, 52 (2010); Eichhorn, supra note 6; Melissa
Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court's 2008-2009 Labor and Employment Cases,
13 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 253, 282-83; Muhammad Umair Khan, Tortured
20121 l637
HeinOnline  -- 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1637 2011-2012
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Steinman has noted, the conventional view is that the decisions will
have "destructive policy consequences" 97 and, as Benjamin Spencer
has put it, will retard rather than expand "access to justice."98
On this point, I must dissent. I find it hard to be unsympathetic
with the concerns over discovery costs that lead the Court to reorient
its understanding of the pleadings in Twombly and Iqbal. Although the
available data on this question has never been very good,99 it does not
take an economist to tell us that discovery is expensive, and that it has
become vastly more so since the Federal Rules were adopted in 1938,
since Conley was decided in 1957, and even perhaps since Swierkiwicz
was decided in 2002.100
There are many reasons why discovery costs have escalated over
the decades, but there are two in particular that are worth mentioning
here. First, corporations are bigger today than they were in the past;
they span nations rather than just cities or states.101 Thus it is more
expensive for corporate defendants to find and gather from their
operations all information relevant to a piece of litigation. Corpora-
tions are more complex than they used to be; asking all their employ-
ees questions and opening all their employees' files is an increasingly
costly endeavor.
Second, changes in technology have permitted more people to
create, distribute, and store more documents than ever before. First
Pleadings: The Historical Development and Recent Fall of the Liberal Pleadings Standard, 3
ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 460, 488-500 (2010); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and
Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on
Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 65, 81 (2010); Robert L. Rothman,
Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, 35 LITIGATION, No. 3, 2009, at 1-2; Dawinder
S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime
Supreme Court's Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BuFF. L. REv. 419, 484 (2010);
Spencer, supra note 43; A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-
Conley Era, 52 How. L.J. 99, 157 (2008); Ryan Mize, Note, From Plausibility to Clarity: An
Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
1245 (2010).
97 Steinman, supra note 46, at 1296.
98 Spencer, supra note 43, at 479.
99 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 12, at 848 ("Although some of these data
are easily available, others exist only in difficult-to-access forms, some do not exist,
and some will never exist.").
100 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
5 (2008).
101 See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322,
1335 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[I]t was not until after World War II that the phenomenon of
the multinational enterprise, as we now know it, became a major factor in the world
scene." (citing P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, THE FuTuRE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE 1 (1976))).
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photocopiers, and now computers, permit hundreds or thousands of
people to receive copies of the same document. Innovations in data
storage now place almost no limit on how much of it can be retained
by corporations and their employees.102 These technological
advances have significantly increased the discoverable material
defendants possess.10 The expense of producing computer files and
reviewing them for relevancy, confidentiality, privilege, etc. (often
referred to as "e-discovery") has been a continuing source of concern
among corporate defendants. 10 4 Indeed, some commentators esti-
mate that "more than ninety percent of discoverable information is
[now] generated and stored electronically."1 0 5
As such, it is not difficult to find cases these days where the cost of
producing requested discovery comes to millions of dollars.106 As
102 See Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010).
103 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE Am. LEGAL Sys., supra note 100, at 5
("Over 99% of the world's information is now generated electronically .... World-
wide, '[p]robably close to 100 billion e-mails are sent daily,' with the average
employee sending and receiving more than 135 e-mails each day. And every day, the
world generates five billion instant messages. . . . The quantity of electronic informa-
tion is growing exponentially; one report shows that new stored information increases
about 30% annually." (internal citations omitted)).
104 See id. ("Verizon, a company at the forefront of e-discovery issues, has collected
data on the costs of e-discovery and internally benchmarked the costs of processing,
reviewing, culling and producing 1 GB of data at between $5,000 and $7,000 (assum-
ing precise keyword searches have been employed). If a 'midsize' case produces 500
GB of data, this means organizations should expect to spend $2.5 to $3.5 million on
the processing, review and production of ESI [electronically stored information].").
These concerns have led to minor changes in the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules in recent years. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (2) (B) (creating a discovery
exemption for ESI not "reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost" and
giving courts the ability, under certain circumstances, to shift the cost of producing
ESI to the party requesting information); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (3) (requiring parties to
meet and confer specifically on e-discovery issues early in the litigation); FED. R. Crv.
P. 34(b) (permitting the requesting party to designate the form or forms in which it
wants ESI produced); FED. R. Crv. P. 37(f) (creating a safe harbor to prevent sanctions
against a party who fails to produce ESI lost as a result of routine, good-faith opera-
tion of an electronic information system).
105 Schwartz & Appel, supra note 57, at 1141.
106 See, e.g., Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *1
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009) (noting that it would have cost over $1 million to search emails
on the backup tapes maintained by the defendant); Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D.
94, 99-101 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating the total cost of email discovery as almost $2.3
million); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557-58 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003) (estimating the cost of privilege review at between $16.5 million and $70
million); Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that it would cost almost $10 million to search emails on the
electronic back-up tapes maintained by one of the defendants); Linnen v. A.H. Rob-
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some commentators have noted, "it is not infrequent for . . . 500 bil-
lion typewritten pages . .. to be at issue in large civil litigation," and
the cost of merely collecting such documents "can be in the millions
of dollars."107 It is even more expensive to review the documents once
they are collected: 108 "assuming it takes a skilled attorney using availa-
ble technology an average rate of one hour to review one hundred
documents, it would take him or her five years to review one million
documents working 2,000 hours per year."109 It was not so long ago
that anyone who worked in a large law firm regularly witnessed legions
of associates spending countless evenings buried in hundreds of boxes
of documents that had to be reviewed for relevancy and privilege.
Although today the boxes have largely been replaced with compact
discs or USB drives, the number of billable hours remains the same.
One large company that has studied its litigation expenses estimates
that it costs between $2.5 and $3.5 million to cull, review, and produce
documents in a case with a "midsize" amount of electronic data
(which it characterized as 500 gigabytes, or approximately fifty million
pages)." 0 Although technology has also made it easier and cheaper
to search through all of this information, it is hard to believe that the
additional savings amount to anything close to the additional
expenses.
Some commentators believe that discovery of this sort is rare, and
that, in the vast majority of cases, discovery is an insignificant bur-
den.1"' There are a handful of studies over the years that are consis-
ins Co., Inc., 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 189, at *4 (Mass. Supp. 1999) (estimating the cost of
restoring back-up tapes at somewhere between $850,000 and $1.4 million).
107 Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting
the Costs ofDiscovery ofElectronically Stored Information, 13 RICH.J. L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2007).
108 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., supra note 100, at 20
(estimating that the overwhelming majority of e-discovery costs are incurred at that
the "attorney review stage").
109 Mazza et al., supra note 107, at 4-5.
110 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs., supra note 100, at 5.
111 See, e.g., Amelia F. Burroughs, Mythed it Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 75 (2001); Edward D.
Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience, 41 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 629, 639 (2010) (criticizing Twombly because "empirical research demon-
strate[s] that discovery abuse leading to excessive pretrial costs was not a problem in
the vast majority of cases filed in the federal courts"); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the
Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial
Power overPleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1238 (2008) ("Even if discovery costs are not
significant in most litigation-they are not, as the best available empirical evidence
shows- Twombly invites defendants to try to say they are." (footnote omitted)); Linda
S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV.
683, 684 (1998).
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tent with this belief,112 but I am skeptical of them. To begin with,
almost all of these studies are quite old-all of them but one are over
thirteen years old-and the world of discovery, especially the elec-
tronic world, has changed a great deal in the meantime. Moreover,
even the most recent study-a 2009 survey of lawyers by the Federal
Judicial Center 1 3-has its limitations. The study found that, in the
median federal civil case that went to discovery, defendants spent only
$20,000 in total litigation costs, with twenty-seven percent of those
costs spent on discovery.1 14
This total litigation figure strikes me as far too low to be even
remotely realistic. The figure is only $5000 greater than the figure the
FederalJudicial Center found in its 1997 survey of lawyers, and, at that
time, defendants stated that fifty percent of their costs had been
incurred in discovery." 5 Thus, if the Federal Judicial Center's studies
are to believed, in the median civil case, the amount of money defend-
ants spent on discovery declined from $7500 in 1997 (half of $15,000)
to $5400 in 2009 (twenty-seven percent of $20,000)! I know of no one
who believes that discovery has become a less expensive enterprise
since the advent of e-discovery.
Nonetheless, even assuming these figures are accurate, I am not
sure they demonstrate that discovery is not expensive these days. To
begin with, the vast majority of cases in federal court end in settle-
ment,116 and, as the Court in Twombly noted, discovery costs affect
settlement dynamics.1 17 In particular, because defendants bear their
own discovery costs, they have every incentive to settle cases in order
to avoid paying such costs.118 Thus, the crucial piece of information
in many cases is not what defendants actually paid in discovery, but
what they would have paid had they not settled, and this information was
not (and probably could not have been) collected in the 2009 Federal
112 See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Dis-
covery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785 (1998) (reviewing the empirical studies of discovery from
1968 to 1997).
113 See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL,
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULEs SURVEY (2009).
114 See id. at 37.
115 See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Prac-
tice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525, 548 (1998).
116 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-
ters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462-63 (2004) (indicat-
ing that the number of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5% in 1962 to
1.8% in 2002).
117 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2006).
118 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAvELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 403
(2004).
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Judicial Center study. Moreover, even if it is true that the typical case
in federal court costs defendants only $20,000 to litigate, then it sug-
gests that it is unlikely that the typical case will even be affected by
Twombly and Iqbal. It hardly seems worthwhile to pay a lawyer several
hundred dollars an hour to file a motion to dismiss if the entire case
can be litigated for such a paltry sum. Rather, Twombly and Iqbal are
likely to make a difference-again, to the extent, in practice, they
make much of a difference at all-only in cases where discovery is
expensive.
The fact that discovery is expensive does not mean, of course,
that discovery is bad and should be curtailed. The problem, as the
Court noted in Twombly, is that discovery expenses can be converted
into a tax on corporations that plaintiffs are free to collect anytime
they file a lawsuit regardless of whether the lawsuit has any merit."19
That is, because it is rational for defendants to settle cases in order to
avoid litigation costs, when plaintiffs do gain access to discovery, it can
add thousands or millions of dollars to the settlement values of their
cases. In a pre- Twombly world, where judges did not (or at least were
not supposed to) try to assess the merits of a plaintiffs case before
proceeding to discovery, cases with little or no merit (e.g., cases that
might have traditionally been weeded out at summary judgment)
might therefore still generate thousands or millions of dollars in a
pre-trial settlement. It is not difficult to understand why it saps social
welfare and constitutes poor public policy to force defendants to pay
large sums to settle cases with no merit (and to thereby encourage
additional filings of such cases).120 Forcing corporations to settle such
119 Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 559 ("[T]he threat of discovery expense will push
cost-conscious defendants to settle even the most anemic cases before reaching those
proceedings.").
120 See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement
Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1851-52 (2004) ("The civil
justice system is rife with situations in which the difference in cost between filing and
ousting meritiess claims or defenses makes the nuisance-value strategy profitable.
The resulting settlements decrease social welfare by vexing and taxing the victimized
party, encouraging the misallocation of legal resources, and diminishing public confi-
dence in the civil liability system."); Levine, supra note 71, at 203 ("[D]isposing of
worthless claims at the pretrial stage .. . saves the parties, as well as the judicial system
... time and money .... It also prevents parties from pursuing meritless settlement
claims by exposing the insufficiency of the claim at an early stage, thus sparing the
other party the threat of expensive litigation that might otherwise force settlement."
(footnote omitted)); Steinman, supra note 46, at 1311 ("If pleading standards are too
lenient, plaintiffs without meritorious claims could force innocent defendants to
endure the costs of discovery and, perhaps, extract a nuisance settlement from a
defendant who would rather pay the plaintiff to make the case go away. The need to
avoid this situation is a commonly asserted policy justification for stricter pleading
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cases is akin to placing a tax on the activities of corporations for no
legitimate social purpose.121
In 1938, when this discovery tax was relatively trivial, it may have
made sense to set the balance of power between plaintiffs and defend-
ants in favor of easy access to discovery for plaintiffs. But things are
different now, and the balance struck in 1938 may not be a sensible
balance today. I therefore have a hard time finding fault with the
Court for taking account of the changed circumstances and trying to
adjust the balance accordingly. Of course, as I said, it may have been
more thoughtful and transparent to make this adjustment through
the rulemaking process rather than through adjudication. Nonethe-
less, I think the Court's motives were pure even if its methods were
not.
III. ARE THERE BETTER RESPONSES TO THE INCREASED
EXPENSE OF DISCOVERY?
This is not to say, however, that the regulatory mechanism the
Court selected to tighten the spigot on discovery-pleading stan-
dards-is the best one. Pleading standards empower judges who have
neither the information nor the incentives to make wise decisions
about which cases are worthy of discovery.122 Making wise decisions
about discovery requires some assessment of how much discovery is
going to cost defendants and how much value plaintiffs might reap
from it;123 at the outset of a case, judges know almost nothing about
standards." (footnote omitted)); id. at 1352 ("Discovery costs are a serious and legiti-
mate concern.").
121 See e.g., Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71072, at *3-4 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (describing settlements to avoid nui-
sance costs as a "tax" that has no benefit to anyone other than those to whom it is
paid); see also Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 120.
122 See Nagareda, supra note 56, at 682 (" [T]he present-day prescription for judi-
cial regulation of the pretrial phase faces an important practical challenge. In one
way or another, the regulator must inform its decision making .... Extension of this
third-party regulatory approach to pleading at the outset of litigation . . . does not
bring with it great latitude for informing the regulator. Rather, the cost that would be
imposed via discovery in order to inform the regulator is thought to be the very prob-
lem to be avoided." (footnote omitted)).
123 Exactly how the costs and benefits should be weighed is open to debate. As
Bruce Hay has demonstrated, it may enhance social welfare in some cases to permit
discovery that is more costly to the defendant than it is beneficial to the plaintiff's
case. See Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
481 (1994).
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either of these things.124 In addition, judges at the trial level face tre-
mendous docket pressures. 125 If they permit a case to go forward to
discovery, they are not only imposing costs on defendants,. they are
imposing costs on themselves: dismissed cases are cleared from their
dockets once and maybe for all. Moreover, pleading standards are an
all-or-nothing regulatory mechanism: either a case passes the standard
and goes forward to discovery, or a case fails the standard and the
plaintiff sees no discovery at all. Because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are understood to be trans-substantive, pleading standards
cannot be tailored to the costs and benefits of a particular case.
Indeed, once a case goes forward to discovery, pleading standards do
nothing to mitigate the nuisance value of discovery. Because parties
are permitted to make discovery requests of each other, yet each party
pays its own expenses to comply with those requests, how much each
party pays is largely determined by their opponents. Needless to say,
this creates terrible incentives to run up discovery costs: the more you
request of your opponent, the more expensive your opponent's litiga-
tion costs become, and the more your opponent is willing to pay you
in a settlement to avoid them. 126 Pleading standards do nothing to
curtail such incentives. Because pleading standards are all-or-nothing,
once they are surpassed, plaintiffs are entitled to the "all."
For all these reasons, scholars have begun to ask whether a better
approach to regulating access to discovery may be fee-shifting rules
where plaintiffs are asked to pay some or all of defendants' discovery
costs.127 Although limited fee-shifting is currently possible under the
Rules,'28 these commentators envision something much more com-
124 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635, 638 (1989)
(arguing that judges "cannot ... know the expected productivity of a given [discov-
ery] request,. . . cannot measure the costs and benefits to the requester, and so can-
not isolate impositional requests").
125 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal
Discovery, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435-36 (1994) [hereinafter Cooter & Rubinfeld, Eco-
nomic Model]; Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery
Rules, 84 GEO. L. J. 61 (1995) [hereinafter Cooter & Rubinfeld, New Discovery]; Easter-
brook, supra note 124; Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix,
51 DuKE L.J. 561, 602 (2001); Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the
Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773
(2011).
127 See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 56, at 684-87; Redish & McNamara, supra note
126.
128 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (B) (permitting courts to "specify conditions
for the discovery"-e.g., fee shifting-when electronically stored information is "not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost").
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prehensive. Fee-shifting rules are attractive because they take the
decision to pursue discovery away from judges and give it to plaintiffs
who would have every reason to weigh carefully the expected costs
and benefits as they would be paying the costs for those benefits.129
Not only does this render more accurate the decision whether to pur-
sue discovery at all, but it also corrects the incentives plaintiffs have to
run up discovery costs once discovery has begun.o30 If plaintiffs inter-
nalize the costs of the discovery they request, they will be careful to
request only discovery for which they expect the benefits of the discov-
ery to their cases to outweigh the costs of the discovery.
But fee-shifting is not a panacea. If the shifting goes both ways
(i.e., defendants must pay plaintiffs' fees sometimes, too), then there
are theoretical models-and even some empirical evidence-predict-
ing that fee shifting may make litigation more rather than less expen-
sive. 131 Moreover, even if the fee shifting goes only one way (i.e., only
plaintiffs must pay defendants' fees and not vice versa), fee-shifting
can create a moral hazard on the defendants' side: if plaintiffs are
paying for defendants' discovery costs, what incentive do defendants
have to keep these costs down?13 2 In addition, fee-shifting can price
out of court plaintiffs with fewer resources at their disposal. Finally,
the private cost-benefit calculation to incur discovery expenses may
not always line up with the social cost-benefit calculation.' 33 Despite
these weaknesses, it is quite possible that fee shifting brings us closer
to an optimal discovery regime than the all-or-nothing approach
offered by pleading standards. This may be especially true for one-way
rules that target discovery costs in particular. For example, plaintiffs
might be asked to pay only the defendants' discovery-related fees and
expenses if they lose their cases, or they might be asked to pay the
129 See Nagaredga, supra note 56, at 684 ("A more fulsome approach would
remove ... the pressure on the role of the court itself as third-party regulator. Here,
the idea would be to make it unnecessary for the court either to estimate the marginal
costs and benefits of discovery, or to do much the same under the rubric of identify-
ing whether the case is of the public-information variety. A form of what one might
call first-party regulation, in short, might substitute for third-party regulation. Specifi-
cally, the law might provide for the shifting of discovery costs post-pleading and pre-
summary judgment. . . .").
130 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic Model, supra note 126; Cooter &
Rubinfeld, New Discovery, supra note 126; Redish, supra note 126; Redish & McNa-
mara, supra note 126.
131 See Avery W. Katz & Chris William Sanchirico, Fee Shifting in Litigation: Survey
and Assessment 6-9, 30-31 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper no. 10-
30, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 714089.
132 See Nagareda, supra note 56, at 686.
133 See supra note 123.
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defendants' fees and expenses only if they lose their cases on summary
judgment. Rules of this sort have already found their way into so-
called "tort reform" proposals for state courts. 134
I do not mean to suggest by this discussion that the Supreme
Court should be faulted for taking the pleading-standard path in
Twombly and Iqbal. The Court can only change that which is within its
purview; it would no doubt take an Act of Congress to institute a per-
vasive fee-shifting regime for discovery costs. As such, the Court's
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal may simply be the first word in a long
dialogue on how best to respond to new litigation realities. 35
134 See, e.g., More TN Tort Reform May Make the 'Loser Pay', TENNESSEAN (Feb. 20,
2012, 3:01 AM), http://www.tennessean.com/article/20120220/NEWS0201/302200
020/More-TN-tort-reform-may-make-loser-pay- (discussing a bill in Tennessee that
"would require a party who loses a motion to dismiss to pay the litigation costs of the
opposing party").
135 Indeed, a bill was introduced in Congress to overturn the Court's decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal and return to the "mere notice" pleading regime. See Notice Plead-
ing Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
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